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Abstract 
 
Warnings can help to prevent damage and harm if they 
are issued timely and provide information that helps 
respondents and population to adequately prepare for 
the disaster to come. Today, many indicators and 
sensor systems are designed to produce alert and 
reduce disaster risks. These systems have proved to be 
effective but, as all systems including human beings, 
part of the system remains unpredictable. Each person 
behaves differently when a problem arises. 
We study in this paper the reactions of the population 
of Verdun, in France, during a public safety exercise. 
This exercise simulated a chemical risk alert, 
including the population participation. We propose 
here an analysis of people's reactions during this 
exercise, based on interviews and surveys, and 
according to different behavioral factors.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Today, thanks to Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT), it is faster and more efficient to 
manage real time data, make maps from geolocalized 
data or make assessments based on scenarios that 
integrate data from different sources. These evolutions 
enabled to improve crisis management systems, 
developed to support those who respond to disasters. 
These crisis management systems help in particular to 
predict as precisely and as soon as possible the 
consequences of a crisis and its evolution in a given 
territory. Despite knowledge and technologies 
developed in order to minimize or avoid disastrous 
consequences that a crisis can produce, they remain, 
by definition, determined by uncertain phenomena, 
which are not always considered in these crisis 
management systems. The vulnerability of territories, 
the need for coordination among services, and the 
probable behaviors of populations-in-danger, for 
example, are sometimes neglected. 
Before and after a crisis, people act according to 
their own knowledge and interpretation schemes. 
These schemes do not always allow people to react in 
an appropriate way to risky situations and can lead to 
dangerous reactions. To respond to these problems, we 
propose to add concerns about human behaviors to the 
design methodologies of Early-Warning Systems. The 
behavior concept needs to be clarified and well 
defined, since it can be approached very differently in 
the scientific sphere. Some speak of "nomadic" 
concept that can take on several meanings according 
to the disciplines [1]. In philosophy, for example, 
definitions rest on the notions of conscience and 
experiences [2], although in cognitive sciences it can 
be approached as a logical suite of actions [3]. The 
most important works on the subject are provided by 
human sciences, notably in ethology and in 
psychology domains [4,5]. In this paper we take up the 
definition of [6] for whom the behavior corresponds to 
the "reactions of a person, considered in a milieu and 
in a given time unit to an excitation or a set of 
stimulation". Human behavior is also integrated in 
artificial intelligence research whose idea is to 
transport knowledge elements in a virtual reality and 
to provide reasoning for the treatment of these 
elements. Applications of artificial intelligence enable 
virtual agents to make strategic choices. We find these 
kinds of research in domains such as automatic 
production of explanations or solving mathematical 
problems [7], but it is still difficult today to integrate 
cognitive dimensions of behaviors to these computer 
science representations. Individual behaviors in crisis 
situations do not correspond to everyday life 
behaviors. It is difficult to represent these behaviors 
from the information that have been obtained after a 
crisis, as this information is always static, punctual and 
contextual. This causes difficulties to integrate the 
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great diversity of human reactions that can appear in 
crisis situations. We can however work to establish 
tendencies, or correlations on factors that orient 
particular behaviors. Understanding human behavior 
in a way that could be integrated in intelligent systems 
is still a challenge that needs the interconnection of 
heterogeneous elements such as personality, social or 
environmental items, logic. 
 
Warning Systems are key elements in crisis 
management systems. They allow people to orient 
their behavior when a crisis is announced by providing 
them information before the crisis, and orienting them 
in the interpretation of the signals perceived during the 
crisis. ICT are particularly used in these systems but 
the potential influence of communication is sometimes 
under-exploited.   
The consideration of laws and phenomena that 
influence human behaviors in crisis situations seems 
for us an important area of research and reflection on 
the improvement of these Warning Systems: warning 
broadcasts, crisis communication, and the 
development of educational policies and targeted 
awareness. The behavior of a population faced with a 
disaster is not the sum of individual’s behaviors. Each 
person has his own interpretative framework, but an 
objective for crisis managers is to lead people to a 
common knowledge and reaction that can be 
integrated in individual interpretative framework.  In 
this paper, we propose to study people’s reactions 
during a public safety exercise organized in the city of 
Verdun, in France. Our objective is to lead to take into 
account the result of the analysis of behavioral factors 
in the design of an Early-Warning System. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next 
section, we propose to present what are Early-Warning 
Systems and the context of our study, we then outline 
the method used to analyze people’s reactions during 
this exercise, before discussing the outcome. Finally 
we present research perspectives and future work. 
 
2. Early-Warning Systems  
 
Early-warning is the provision of timely and 
effective information that allows organizations and 
individuals to take action to avoid or reduce their risk 
and prepare for effective response [8]. According to 
the nature of disaster, Warning Systems (WS) or 
Early-Warning Systems (EWS) are provided, WS 
being limited to unpredictable disasters, in conditions 
where no signals can be interpreted in advance to 
assess the potential disasters and prepare populations. 
In the case of snowfall for example, conditions that 
cause disasters are so complex and dependent on each 
other that experts can only draw up risk maps or 
organize planned prevention actions and alert 
populations when events occur, effectively. They 
cannot assess the event and evacuate the population in 
advance. This is the main difference between WS and 
EWS which provide warnings with sufficient time for 
people to act. 
We consider more precisely in this paper, 
according to [9], that an EWS is a "Chain of 
information communication systems comprising 
sensor, detection, decision, and broker-subsystems, in 
the given order, working in conjunction, forecasting 
and signaling disturbances adversely acting the 
stability of the physical world; and giving sufficient 
time for the response system to prepare resources and 
response actions to minimize the impact on the 
stability of the physical world". 
A complete and effective EWS comprises four 
elements [10]: 
- Risk knowledge: knowledge of the relevant 
hazard and vulnerability; 
- Monitoring and warning service: technical 
capacities to constantly monitor hazard 
precursors, prediction of potential risks and 
warning issue; 
- Dissemination and communication: 
dissemination of understandable warnings with 
prior preparedness information; 
- Response capability: knowledge of risks, warning 
services plans and appropriate actions for persons 
at risk. 
In this sequential list, each element has two direct 
links and interactions with each of the other elements. 
Failure of any part of the system will imply failure of 
the whole system. Human factor in particular plays a 
significant and transversal role in all steps [11, 12]. 
Before and during disasters, people often act 
according to their own interpretation schemes [13] 
which are not always adapted to risk situations and can 
lead to dangerous reactions. Communication 
technology is a key element in EWS to improve 
behaviors, it provides common pre-disaster 
knowledge before disasters, and guidance to interpret 
cues during events. The potential influence of 
communication can be under exploited, for example, 
warnings are often simplified and reduced to a simple 
“Red Alert”, instead of providing concrete advice and 
guidance [14]. 
EWS are constantly evolving, reliability indicators 
and modelling methods such as Bayesian Networks 
[15, 16, 17] permit us to evaluate their technical 
quality and performance. These indicators are 
objective and useful to make decision-makers aware, 
capable of taking measures for improvement or 
reorganization of the system’s materials. They do not 
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allow to evaluate the human elements of EWS, 
especially response capability. Risk comprehension 
and interpretation of warnings is highly subjective but 
they can have important consequences such as the 
inappropriate responses to warnings delivered by 
Météo-France1 in October 2015 that have not been 
followed and lead to the deaths of people trapped in 
their cars in tunnels or in underground car parks, as 
they tried to get their cars out. 
 
3. Context  
 
To test the interest of integrating behavioral studies 
to EWS, we plan to analyze populations behaviors in 
reaction to warnings triggered during several exercises 
organized in France. 
 
3.1. Public safety in France 
  
In France, protection against accidents and 
disasters is a function of the State. This role is 
provided by the civil safety teams, which rests on 
different specialist services who act for civil safety, 
firefighters, military units of training and intervention, 
pilots of aircraft and helicopters as well as mine-
clearing experts. Their roles are directed by the 
Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile et de la 
Gestion des Crises (General Direction of the Civil 
Safety and of the Crisis Management) under the 
direction of the Ministry of the Interior. They define 
particularly the roles of evaluation, preparation, 
coordination and application of protection, the 
information and Warning Systems for populations, the 
prevention of civil risks of all types, and the planning 
of civil security measures. This organization rests on 
the 101 prefectures present on the French territory. 
In this study, we propose to analyze people’s 
reactions to warnings tested during a civil safety 
exercise organized by the prefecture of Verdun2. This 
exercise responds to a European Directive that 
imposes all SEVESO industrials with a high risk of 
accident to organize every three years a civil safety 
exercise. Industries classified as SEVESO sites are 
establishments where the quantity of dangerous 
products exceeds the thresholds laid down in the 
European SEVESO Directive. In accordance with the 
Directive, the French regulatory texts require the 
different actors to draw up action plans which have 
been tested during the exercise in Verdun: 
                                                 
1 Météo-France is the French national meteorological 
service. 
2 It is a small city of the Meuse department in Grand 
Est region, located in the northeastern France. Its area 
- the PPI (Particular Plan of Intervention), managed 
by the prefecture; 
- the POI (Internal Operation Plan), managed by the 
company; 
- the PCS (Communal Plan of Protection) managed 
by the municipalities. 
These exercises can also implicate population if 
the civil safety teams in the prefectures decide to test 
the population participation. In France, for some years, 
the number of exercises that include the population 
participation has significantly increased. 
 
3.2. PPI Inéos exercise 
 
The PPI Inéos exercise, realized on March 22 
2017, was dedicated to test the actions plans of the 
different actors, the communication between the 
actors, the public information management and the 
Warning System in response to an accident that would 
happen at the Inéos company, which would lead to the 
liberation of a toxic cloud of chlorine.  
It was prepared with the cooperation of the Inéos 
company, the local collectivities, including twelve 
municipalities that participated to the exercise, the 
regional roads management, the meteorology services, 
the rescue services and the telecom, electricity and gas 
organizations. 
In this study, we focus on the populations reactions 
to the warnings that have been triggered. Two kinds of 
warning were triggered by the state services: the sirens 
of two different municipalities and messages provided 
by the smartphone application SAIP (Alert and 
Information System for the Population). This 
application send warning messages to people who 
have already installed the application, it requires an 
internet connection to be active. Some others warnings 
were deployed by municipalities such as alarm bells or 
interphone communications.    
A campaign of awareness had been launched 
before the exercise to inform people of the date of the 
exercise and to specify the waited reactions. When the 
warnings were triggered, people had to react according 
to their situation.  
- If they were outside, they had to move to the 
closest building, the street being the more exposed 
area.  
- If they were traveling by car, they had to cut the 
ventilation of the vehicle, stop and to take refuge 
in the closest building. They should not try to 
escape. Escape in the situation simulated during 
is 31.03 km2 (11.98 sq mi) with a density of 590/km2 
(227,8/sq mi). 18,327 inhabitants live in the city. 
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the exercise was dangerous for their own safety 
and disturbing for the circulation of the 
responding emergency services vehicles.  
- If they were inside, people had to stay inside the 
building. They should not go towards the incident 
or try to collect their children from school. 
Once in a safe place, they had to close doors, windows 
and draughts, stop air-cons and reduce the heating. 
They had to breathe through a humid cloth, listen to 
information from local Media and keep calm waiting 
for the warning signal for the end of the exercise or an 
evacuation order.  
The Warning System tested in the PPI Inéos can 
be, to a certain extent, considered as an EWS. Indeed, 
unlike wildfires, hurricanes, earthquakes or even 
financial or ecological crisis that can be detected in 
advance, the industrial risk of liberation of a toxic 
cloud of chlorine cannot be predicted, but the crisis 
itself can be prepared for and anticipated according to 
the cloud movements.  
 
4. Method and panel  
 
4.1. Behavioral factors studied 
 
In a previous study [18], we identified twenty 
factors that influence human behaviors in crisis 
situations from researches in literature. We assembled 
them in two categories according to the objects they 
refer to, individual and environmental, and to the types 
of information sources that allow to characterize them. 
We present here these factors with a list of indicators 
associated to each of them that have been studied in 
the PPI Inéos exercise. We did not collect information 
on all of the indicators that are listed for these factors. 
 Civil status: age, sex, nationality, residence place, 
level of schooling, occupation. 
 Personality: desires, moral principles, sociability, 
beliefs, religious or not, capacity to take 
decisions, mimetic reactivity. 
 Motivation to escape/defend: motivations are 
strongly related with the experience, risk 
assessment, the current action and the 
physiological signals identified after. 
 Responsibility: in the situation when a fire alert is 
given in a school for example, a teacher can have 
different reactions depending on whether he is 
alone in his office or he is in a classroom, teaching 
to a student group. He may have no reaction if he 
is alone, but he will be much well-disposed to 
evacuate with his students in good conditions if he 
is responsible for them and has to set an example 
for them to follow. 
 Emotions: joy, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, 
surprise, contempt. 
 Experience: crisis faced in the past, objective 
ability to escape/defend, subjective ability to 
escape/defend. 
 Explicited knowledge: general knowledge shared 
by the population, training followed, access to 
documents, access to knowledge sharing tools 
[19]. 
 Risk assessment: objective assessment, subjective 
assessment. 
 Perception of the EWS: we define perception as 
the process of collecting, organizing, and 
interpreting stimuli which may be information or 
knowledge coming from different sources [20]. 
 Current action: interaction, concentration and 
movement needed. 
 Geographic zone characteristics [21]: zone extent, 
population density, poverty level, economic 
status, urban level, population pyramid, cultural 
characteristics: individual versus group 
orientation, trust in government. 
 Interaction and mobility capacity: frequented 
area, smart-phone, access to transport. 
 Perceptible signals of the crisis: indicators of 
perceptible signals depend directly of the type of 
crisis that is concerned. This is why we have 
defined three generic indicators: visual signals, 
sound signals, and olfactory signals. 
 Period characteristics: day/night, number of hours 
from the crisis peak. 
 Alerts / Transmitted information: quantity and 
quality of information transmitted, number of 
broadcasting channels [22]. 
 Entourage characteristics: density of population, 
presence of authority representatives, security 
level of the area, presence of close relations. 
 Behaviors of the closest people: contagion level 
of the three dominant behaviors. The contagion 
level of an agent varies according to the number 
of neighborhoods with similar activities [23, 24]. 
 
Data on the different factors have been collected 
from questions asked to the population on the area of 
the PPI Inéos exercise and from information on the 
places where people have been questioned. One of our 
objectives was to obtain different perspectives to 
understand people’s reactions during the exercise. 
This is why we used a survey largely open, with only 
few closed questions, to enhance our understanding 
and let people think about their reactions and the goal 
of the exercise. 
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4.2. Data collection 
 
4.2.1 The survey 
 
Interviews have been conducted from face-to-face 
meetings and online surveys, we also launched an 
online anonymous survey in March 2017, created with 
the Open Source software survey tool Limesurvey3. 
We collected information about the age, sex, 
profession and place of residence of the participants. 
Then, they answered to four sets of questions.  
The first set focused on people’s knowledge of the 
exercise: awareness to recognize warnings, training, 
information received about risks and waited behaviors, 
and risk perception when a warning is triggered. This 
set included also questions about the actions that 
people were doing when the warnings were launched. 
The second set of questions referred to people’s 
perception of warnings, their understanding and 
comments on the siren and the message sent by the 
SAIP application for smartphone (if they had 
downloaded it before). 
Then, a third set of questions addressed only to 
people who received warnings, directly or not were 
related to the feelings and actions of these people 
during the exercise. We asked questions about their 
emotions, stress levels, time between the warning 
trigger and their actions, their reflection on the 
possibility of taking other actions, their 
communication during the exercise, the reactions of 
people around them and their judgment on these 
reactions. We also asked questions about leadership 
phenomenon. 
Finally, the fourth set was related to the 
experiences of people in similar crisis, their reflections 
about the possible reactions they may have in risky 
situations that are not exercises, and information about 
their personality.   
 
4.2.2 Data analysis 
 
For this study, 134 people were questioned. 19 
people answered the paper survey (from face-to-face 
meetings) on the day of the exercise, we conducted 
these interviews in and around the area of the St Anne 
High School, in the city of Verdun. 115 people replied 
to the online survey, during the days that followed the 
exercise. On these 115 responses, 38 come from the 
online version of the survey that the Town Halls sent 
to their residents, and the last 77 replies come from an 
online adapted version of the survey made for the 
students and teachers of the St Anne High School.  
                                                 
3 https://www.limesurvey.org 
5. Results and discussion  
 
5.1 About the respondents 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of respondents by 
age: about 43% are between the ages of 16 and 25, 
which can be explained by the proximity of the person 
interviewing the respondents to a school. 
 
 
Figure 1: Age of respondents (in %) 
 
Moreover, among the 44 people who agreed to 
give information about their job, it appears in Figure 2 
that in addition to students, many retirees and 
employees responded to the survey. Many socio-
professional categories feel concerned. 
 
 
Figure 2: Socio-Professional category of respondents 
(in %) 
 
As displayed on Figure 3, among the 46 people 
who agreed to indicate their place of residence, we can 
observe that about 37% of respondents lived in Verdun 
or its suburbs and 39% within 5 km around Verdun. 
Only citizens located near the place of the exercise 
answered to the survey. 
 
 
Figure 3: Place of residence of respondents (in %) 
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Finally, as displayed on Figure 4, the three main 
personality traits that correspond to the respondents 
are: calm (about 52%), rational (about 35%) and 
generous (about 27%). 
 
 
Figure 4: Representative personality traits (> 5% of the 
population) 
 
5.2 Awareness / Preparation 
 
The majority of respondents were aware of the 
alert and they knew the behavior to adopt through 
poster campaign or by the practice of past exercises. 
Although the efforts of the mayors on the exercise 
were highlighted, some respondents made remarks 
about raising awareness. In particular, they talked 
about the need to do exercises more frequently, to 
reinforce the poster campaign, to better inform the 
population by indicating which signal corresponds to 
what risk and finally to raise the sound level of the 
siren which was not heard in some cities located at 
more than 5km (3.1 miles) of the siren.  
We can note that respondents are aware of their 
level of risk exposure when the alert is triggered 
outside an exercise: as displayed on Figure 5, more 
than 40% consider that there is a risk and more than 
49% consider that this risk is large or huge. 
 
 
Figure 5: Level of risk exposure when the alert is 
triggered outside an exercise (perceived by 
respondents – in %) 
 
We discovered an association of these levels with 
age of respondents, as showed on Figure 6, only a 
fraction of those over 15 consider the risk to be huge, 
the proportion being highest amongst those of 50 years 
or older, with 25% of them considering that the risk is 
huge when they hear the warnings outside an exercise. 
It is finally noteworthy that 20% of under 15 year olds 
consider that the risk is low. 
 
Figure 6: Level of risk exposure when the alert is 
triggered outside an exercise according to the age of 
the respondents (perceived by respondents – in %) 
 
5.3 At the time of the alert 
 
77% of respondents heard the siren. As mentioned 
earlier, this can be explained by the distance between 
the place where the alert have been triggered and the 
location of the respondents. In addition, some people 
indicated that they did not pay attention to the signals. 
Around 18% did not understand that it was an alert, 
and, unfortunately, 90% of the respondents did not 
receive the message from the SAIP (Alert and 
Information System for the Population) application on 
their smartphone. However, as shown in Figure 7, 
respondents were predominantly at work or at school: 
about 67% (this figure is biased because interviews 
were conducted near a school), or outside. Preparation 
in the workplace / school seems to be essential. 
 
 
Figure 7: Activity when triggering the alert (in %) 
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Indeed, risk culture is particularly important in the 
St Anne High School of Verdun. Every year the school 
organizes exercises for fire safety or attack 
simulations. The latest exercise which simulated an 
attack had only been realized one month before the PPI 
Inéos exercise. Teachers were prepared to face a crisis, 
and were vigilant to warnings. For each exercise, they 
receive information and instructions from a dedicated 
application created by the school for crisis response. 
This application is highly appreciated by teachers, and 
it’s instructions are followed. This is not the case for 
the national SAIP application for the main reason that 
the existence of the application is unknown for most 
of people and that the warnings that were sent by the 
application were sometimes not received or too late, at 
least more than thirty minutes after the sirens were 
activated.  
Reactions to warnings are contrasted. Most people 
who responded to the poll had confined themselves, 
but many of them replied that they had done nothing, 
for different reasons: they had not heard the siren (the 
sound level was too low), they knew “it was a false 
alarm”, they did not see anyone in the city reacting, 
they could not identify what they had to do and many 
of them were not sure whether the siren was a warning 
or only a test of the proper functioning of the 
equipment. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, the majority of people (22%) 
who felt responsible for other people did not do 
anything to help them. It would be interesting to verify 
or test this result after real crisis situations. 
 
 
Figure 8: Actions carried out by people who felt 
responsible (from close or unknown people - in %) 
 
Crossing the actions of people who felt responsible 
for others with the main personality traits, we can 
observe, as shown on Figure 9, that people who 
consider themselves in solidarity with others, attentive 
or responsible responded almost in the same 
proportion that they broadcasted the alert, they 
soothed or they guided people. During the exercise, 
voluntary, organized and experiented people did not 
think to soothe close relations. And finally people who 
did not have any reactions were mostly calm and less 
significantly organized people.    
 
Figure 9: Actions carried out by people who felt 
responsible according to their personality, for 
personalities that correspond to actions (from close 
relations or strangers - in %) 
 
On Figure 10, we can observe that over 70% of 
respondents indicated that they did not feel any 
emotion at receiving the alert. Only 11% reported 
being stressed and 9% stunned. Of course, these 
results needs to be put into perspective, most 
respondents knew that it was an exercise. 
 
 
Figure 10: Emotions felt on receiving the alert (in %) 
 
Figure 11 shows that more than 60% of 
respondents acted immediately after the alert and 
about 20% in the first half hour. Again, it seems that 
14% of respondents did not play the game (no action). 
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Figure 11: Time elapsed between the triggering of the 
alert and the actions of the respondents (in %) 
 
To remain in non-action, 75% of respondents did 
not contact relatives. In the majority of cases, 
respondents indicated that they did not establish 
contact because they either knew that it was an 
exercise or they knew that they should not saturate 
telephone lines.  
We can note that only a small number of people of 
50 years old or older, when they react, had a time of 
reaction longer than 30 minutes, see Figure 12. The 
greater proportion of people who did not react came 
from the 26 to 50 years of age group. This result 
reveals a relationship between the age and the activity 
of people and their time of reaction.       
 
Figure 12: Time elapsed between the triggering of the 
alert and the actions of the respondents according to 
their age (in %) 
 
5.4 Feedback 
 
More than 43% of respondents considered that the 
people around them showed an appropriate response 
to the alert. Otherwise, it should be noted that only 
15% of respondents had experienced a similar 
situation through exercises, of which only 2.5% had 
experienced a real situation close to the situation of 
this exercise. Finally, over 62% think that they would 
have reacted differently if they had not known the date 
of the exercise. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
The diversity of reactions and perceptions related 
to the exercise, on risk and warning perception, 
reaction time, emotions or crisis preparedness engage 
us to pursue the objective of understanding behavioral 
factors in crisis situations. We are conscious that the 
PPI Inéos exercise was not considered as a real crisis 
for citizens, and reactions were of course different than 
they would be in a real crisis. Nevertheless, from the 
interviews with citizens, we consider that people are 
able to have a constructed and critical opinion on their 
reactions during the exercise, and are able to project 
themself in the hypothesis of a real crisis.   
Our analysis implicates also various biases. We 
emphasize the fact that 71% of respondents were in or 
around the St Anne High School premises, the 
population of students from 15 to 18 years old and of 
teachers are then over-represented. In addition, the 
support was not completely homogenous, we used 
paper forms to proceed for the face-to-face interviews 
which can have an impact on answers, such as the fact 
that the online survey proposed by the direction of the 
St Anne High School have been slightly adapted to suit 
the respondents.  
 
This analysis is specific to the environment where 
the exercise has been made. Contextual factors in a 
vulnerability study could complement this survey and 
give more accurate information to help discover 
correlations between the different behavioral factors. 
The density of population for example, the poverty 
level or the cultural background of the area are 
indicators that could be considered as step backwards 
on the results for more generic work.  
 
The objective of integrating our results in the 
Early-Warning System of the PPI Inéos plan to 
improve population responses could be realized by 
different integration levels, according to the four 
elements of Early-Warning Systems:  
- Risk knowledge: for a better field knowledge, 
notably from morphological indicators; 
- Monitoring and warning service: no 
improvements are considered for this element at 
this time; 
- Dissemination and communication: the 
vocabulary and the information of warnings and 
messages could be adapted according to the 
channel diffusion for a targeted communication; 
- Response capability: interviews and online 
surveys revealed the importance of the exercises 
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and of the perception of risks. Training and 
population awareness could be targeted according 
to the needs identified. For example, 
communication could be improved by the use of 
specific words such as “entertainment” more than 
“exercise” or “false alarm”, such as retained from 
responses.   
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this paper, we study the reactions of the 
population of Verdun (France) during a public safety 
exercise (PPI Inéos exercise). This exercise simulated 
a chemical risk alert. Our analysis of people’s 
reactions during this exercise, based on interviews and 
surveys highlights some important points. Although 
many people feel concerned, whatever their age or 
socio-professional categories, the persons have 
responded according to the recommended behaviors. 
It turns out that the siren was not heard/understood by 
all in the same way or that some people did not play 
the game. Our analysis shows that some information 
cannot be retrieved via non-human sensors, and that 
taking populations into account, especially through 
their behavior, is of primary importance. Many areas 
of Early-Warning Systems can be improved, including 
dissemination and preparedness. 
This work lays the theoretical foundations for 
ongoing work, in which the forms will be extended to 
incorporate new morphological questions, more 
precise and accurate scales, and proposition of 
responses. The free text responses will be reduced and 
only proposed in the supports for physical interviews. 
Future work consists also in his conceptual part in the 
creation of an ontology to provide a clear and shared 
semantic vision of the concepts related to behaviors 
and warnings that we use.  
Finally, the heterogeneity of the indicators that we 
presented leads us to adaptations and to propose 
formulas of aggregation that are not presented here. 
From these improvements tested in next civil safety 
exercises, we plan to provide statistical work for data 
analysis with Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
methods.   
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